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ABSTRACT: The motivation behind the collection of papers presented in this THEORIA forum on Abductive reasoning is my 
book Abductive Reasoning: Logical Investigations into the Processes of Discovery and Explanation. These contributions raise 
fundamental questions. One of them concerns the conjectural character of abduction. The choice of a logical 
framework for abduction is also discussed in detail, both its inferential aspect and search strategies. Abduction is 
also analyzed as inference to the best explanation, as well as a process of epistemic change, both of which chal-
lenge the argument-like format of abduction. Finally, the psychological question of whether humans reason abduc-
tively according to the models proposed is also addressed. I offer a brief summary of my book and then comment 
on and respond to several challenges that were posed to my work by the contributors to this issue. 
Keywords: abduction, abductive inference, discovery, heuristics. 
A Summary 
In Abductive Reasoning: Logical Investigations into Discovery and Explanation, I offer a logical 
analysis of a particular type of scientific reasoning, namely abduction, that is, reasoning 
from an observation to its possible explanations. This approach naturally leads to connec-
tions with theories of explanation and empirical progress in the philosophy of science, to 
computationally oriented theories of belief change in artificial intelligence, and to the phi-
losophical position known as Pragmatism, proposed by Charles Peirce, to whom the term 
abduction owes its name.  
 More precisely, the book is divided into three parts: (I) Conceptual Framework, (II) 
Logical Foundations, and (III) Applications, each of which is briefly described in what 
follows.  
 In part I, the setting for the logical approach taken in this book is presented. One the 
one hand, chapter 1 offers a general overview of the logics of discovery enterprise as well 
as the role of logic in scientific methodology, both in philosophy of science and in the 
fields of artificial intelligence and cognitive science. The main argument is that logic should 
have a place in the normative study in the methodology of science, on a par with historical 
and other formal computational approaches. Chapter 2 provides an overview of research 
on abduction, showing that while there are general features and in most cases the main 
inspiration comes from the American pragmatist, Charles S. Peirce, each approach has 
taken a different route. To delineate our subject more precisely, and create some order, a 
general taxonomy for abductive reasoning is then proposed, of which a brief description is 
the following: 
A Taxonomy for Abduction 
As for the logical form of abduction it may be viewed as a threefold relation: 
 θ, α ⇒ ϕ 
between an observation ϕ, an abduced item α, and a background theory θ. Against this 
background, we propose three main parameters that determine types of explanatory ar-
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guments. (i) An ‘inferential parameter’ (⇒) sets some suitable logical relationship among 
explananda, background theory, and explanandum. (ii) Next, ‘triggers’ determine what 
kind of abductive process is to be performed: ϕ may be a novel phenomenon, one which 
did not existed there before, but not in conflict with the theory. Alternatively, ϕ may be an 
anomalous phenomenon, one which is indeed is in conflict with the existing theory θ. 
(iii) Finally, ‘outcomes’ (α) are the various products (abductive explanations) of an abduc-
tive process: facts, rules, or even new theories. 
Several forms of abduction are obtained by instantiating these three parameters: the 
kind of reasoning involved (e.g., deductive, statistical), the kind of observation triggering 
the abduction (novelty, or anomaly with respect to some background theory), and the kind 
of explanations produced (facts, rules, or theories). This taxonomy gives us the big and 
varied picture of abductive reasoning. 
In part II, the logical foundations of this enterprise are laid down. In chapter 3, abduc-
tion is investigated as a notion of logical inference. It is shown that this type of reasoning 
can be analyzed within various kinds of logical consequence as the underlying inference, 
namely as classical inference (backwards deduction), statistical or as some type of non-
monotonic inference. The logical properties of these various ‘abductive explanatory kinds’ 
are then investigated within the ‘logical structural analysis’, as proposed for non-
monotonic consequence relations in artificial intelligence and dynamic styles of inference 
in formal semantics. As a result we can classify forms of abduction by different structural 
rules. A computational logic analysis of processes producing abductive inferences is then 
presented in chapter 4, using and extending the mathematical framework of semantic tab-
leaux. I show how to implement various search strategies to generate various forms of 
abductive explanations.  
Part III is a confrontation of the previous analysis and foundations with existing themes 
in the philosophy of science and artificial intelligence. In particular, in chapter 5, I analyze the 
well-known Hempelian models for scientific explanation (the deductive-nomological one, 
and the inductive-statistical one) as forms of abductive explanatory arguments, the ultimate 
products of abductive reasoning. This then provides them with a structural logical analysis in 
the style of chapter 3. In chapter 6, I address the question of the dynamics of empirical pro-
gress, both in theory evaluation and in theory improvement. I meet the challenge made by 
Theo Kuipers, namely to operationalize the task of ‘instrumentalist abduction’, that is, theory 
revision aiming at empirical progress. I offer a reformulation of Kuipers’ account of empiri-
cal progress into the framework of (extended) semantic tableaux, in the style of chapter 4, 
and show that this is indeed an appealing method to account for empirical progress of some 
specific kind of empirical progress, that of lacunae.  
The remaining two chapters have a common argument, namely that abduction may be 
viewed as a process of epistemic change for belief revision, an idea which connects natu-
rally to the notion of abduction in the work of Charles Peirce, and that of belief revision in 
the work of Peter Gärdenfors, thus suggesting a direct link between philosophy and artifi-
cial intelligence. In chapter 7, I explore the connection between abduction and Pragma-
tism, as proposed by Peirce, showing that the former is conceived as an epistemic proce-
dure for logical inquiry, and that it is indeed the basis for the latter, conceived as a method 
of philosophical reflection with the ultimate goal of generating ‘clear ideas’. Moreover, I 
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argue that abduction viewed in this way can model dynamics of belief revision in artificial 
intelligence. For this purpose, an extended version of the semantic tableaux of chapter 4 
provides a new representation of the operations of expansion, and contraction, all of 
which shapes the content of chapter 8. 
Questions and Challenges 
Is Abduction Ignorance-Preserving? 
In his contribution “Ignorance and Semantic Tableaux: Aliseda on Abduction” John 
Woods raises two fundamental aspects of abduction. One concerns its subjunctive charac-
ter, expressed in Peirce’s well-known logical formulation: 
The surprising fact, C, is observed. 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course. 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. 
The other related aspect highlights the conjectural nature of hypothesis A, suggesting 
the characterization of abduction as an ignorance-preserving inference. According to 
Woods, abduction is one of three possible responses to an ignorance problem, one in 
which one attempts to solve a target through answering a question of the type Does such 
and such is the case? The first kind of response to an ignorance problem corresponds to ac-
quiring new knowledge in order to solve the target and perform an action; the second one 
corresponds to abandoning the target and leave it unsolved, without performing any fur-
ther action. A third possibility is abduction, in which the target remains unsolved, but still 
the conjectural result is the basis for a new action. An application par excellence of this 
third type of response to an ignorance problem is found in the area of law, concerning 
criminal jurisprudence in the common law. “When jurors find an accused guilty of the 
offence with which he has been charged, they do not know whether in fact the offence 
was committed by him” (Woods, page 316, this issue). 
According to this view, abduction is reasoning which fails to fully answer the ignorance 
problem, but offers reasons as basis for certain actions. This illustration in law is indeed 
strong evidence of the way humans do act in the absence of knowledge —the accused is 
charged and thus convicted. This kind of analysis is essential for research in practical logic 
for cognitive systems, the topic of concern to Woods and his collaborators.  
The Choice of a Logic for Abduction 
One of the key issues in any kind of conceptual analysis, is the choice of a logical frame-
work. Different choices lead to different representations and may come from different 
conceptions. The approach by Woods, known as the GW model, enters in conflict with 
the AKM model —coined after the initials of some of its promoters, of which I am one of 
them. This is the logical approach aiming to characterize abduction as an inference, often 
expressed as deductive logical entailment, with some additional conditions. The AKM 
model runs in parallel with Hempel’s DN-model, in the sense that it is mainly a deductive 
logical account in which the theory, together with the explanation (abduction) do entail the 
explanandum. It does not require abductive inference to be ignorance-preserving. The 
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AKM model is therefore consequentialist, as opposed to the one of Woods which is sub-
junctivist.1
One interesting new research question is whether the AKM model generalized as to 
include weaker forms of consequence relations, involving one for conjectural entailment, 
may allow the representation of the GW model, at least in so far the underlying inference 
is concerned. In fact, as acknowledged of my approach, my model of abduction allows for 
several forms of consequence, for I consider the logical relation between explananda and 
explanandum as a general parameter, as shown in my proposed taxonomy. However, I do 
not see how to represent the GW model in a straightforward manner. Fortunately, two of 
the presented contributions to this issue may shed some light to this challenge, for they 
attempt to model finer views of abductive inference, and go beyond my analysis on several 
forms of consequence and their corresponding structural rules for abduction. 
In their contribution “Metamodeling Abduction”, Angel Nepomuceno and Fernando 
Soler put forward an interesting view of abduction as a consequence relation, drawing on 
Makinson’s bridges between classical and nonmonotonic logic; in particular using a pivotal-
assumption consequence,2 of which we may say that it assumes rather than affirms the prem-
ises. They propose to represent a general abductive problem in terms of an explicative 
relation <T, F>, one in which a fact F is explained by S (a set of solutions) with respect to 
a consequence modulo T (the background theory) and α (an explanation) . The following 
is their representation of my plain abduction (T, α  F ):  
F  α, T  S 
This explicative consequence relation  α, T may be characterized in terms of structural 
rules, just as I did for my version of consistent abduction (Aliseda 2006, cf. chapter 3). The 
authors have observed that in general, an explicative consequence of this kind, validates 
the structural rules corresponding to reflexivity, right cut and right monotony.  
Another interesting point regarding the view of abduction as a logical inference is 
shown by Ilkka Niiniluoto in his contribution “Structural Rules for Abduction”, in which 
he explores several structural rules for “backward” abductive reasoning, that is from ob-
servations to explanatory theories. One of his proposals for (partially) representing Peirce’s 
logical formulation is as a form of converse deductive explanation, a notion defined by the au-
thor back in 1973: 
eAh  =df  hEe.3
 As it turns out, several of these attempts for characterizing consequence relations re-
garding inductive and abductive styles of inference, were actually proposed in the context 
of philosophy of science, to capture notions like inductive confirmation. These were in-
deed analyzed with similar forms of structural rules as those later used in artificial intelli-
gence for the characterization of nonmonotonic logics. For example, Niiniluoto shows 
                                                     
1 In my view, the AKM and the GW models are complementary. While the former focuses on the role of surprise 
in Peirce’s formulation, the latter centers its attention on the subjunctive form of the abductive formulation. 
2 x is a consequence of A modulo K  iff x is a consequence of K ∪ A. That is, A 
K
 x  iff K ∪ A  x. 
3 This says that h is abducible from e  iff  h deductively explains e. 
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that the well-known high probability criterion of confirmation (eIh  iff  P(h/e) > q ≥ ½) satisfies 
the principle of Special Consequence (SC): 
(SC) If  eIh and h  g, then eIg.4
This confirmation criterion is known as characteristic to “enumerative” and “eliminative” 
reasoning.  
 Thus, new explicative consequence relations may be defined by considering pivotal-
assumptions —as the one presented by Nepomuceno and Soler— or even by pivotal-
valuations or pivotal-rules consequences. Moreover, a variety of structural rules may be 
checked for satisfiability for all these kinds of consequence relations, and sets of these may 
characterize each one in turn. In fact, as Niiniluoto suggests, the way to go may be to combi-
ne several notions of consequence at hand, in accordance with my proposal for exploring 
structural rules combining deductive and inductive explanations (Aliseda 2006, chapter 5).  
 Perhaps in actual research on abduction we are still in the phase in which there is no 
single consequence capturing all aspects of abduction, but rather a set of consequence 
relations, each one capturing a partial picture of it. However, under my view, this situation 
rather reminds us that “abduction is not a new form of inference. It is rather a topic-
dependant practice of explanatory reasoning, which can be supported by various notions 
of inference, classical or otherwise” (Aliseda 2006, p. xii). Moreover, even when the under-
lying inference is deductive in nature, given the additional requirements that abduction 
calls for, there are multiple and various ways to characterize abduction as a logical infer-
ence, and in any interesting case, the resulting inference is never fully deductive.  
The Choice of Semantic Tableaux as a Logical Framework for Abduction 
Another logical choice I made in the design of my abductive model was the use of seman-
tic tableaux as the logical framework for abduction.5 This is a refutation method, and 
works by attempting to construct models (counterexamples) for the premises and the 
negation of the conclusion. When this can be done, the resulting tableaux-tree has open 
branches, each one representing a verifying model. The failure of the original consequence 
is thus reflected by the open branches. The open tree indicates that the theory is consistent 
and that the theory does not entail the proposed conclusion (neither its negation). It turns 
out that this is precisely the precondition for abduction (the novelty kind). Thus, perform-
ing abduction comes down to closing the open branches, and this is a very intuitive and 
appealing way of understanding abduction. In reflecting whether the choice of tableaux 
was a good one, I can only repeat myself about the virtues of this logical framework:  
Semantic tableaux are a natural vehicle for implementing abduction. They allow for a clear formulation 
for what counts as an abductive explanation, while being flexible and suggestive as to possible modifi-
cations and extensions. Derivability and consistency, the ingredients of consistent and explanatory ab-
duction, are indeed a natural blend in tableaux, because we can manipulate open and close branches 
with equal ease. (Aliseda 2006, p. 130) 
                                                     
4 This says that if h is inducible from e, and g follows from h, then g is inducible from e. 
5 The framework of Semantic Tableaux was proposed independently by Hintikka and Beth in the late fifties, and a 
decade later refined by Smullyan (cf. Woods contribution for a summary of my semantic abductive tableaux 
approach and Chapter 4 of my book for all further details). 
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However, there is no unique way to devise a computational procedure to produce those 
abductions which close the open branches. Note that just closing the open branches 
would produce all abductive explanations which are inconsistent with the theory, and this 
is of course undesirable. Therefore, a further selection process has to be performed, ideally 
filtering only those solutions which we really want to count as explanations, or at least, 
avoiding those which are inconsistent or redundant. Extended Semantic Tableaux of the 
kind I propose, are the logical structure over which a certain calculi with its particular heu-
ristics is operating. The semantics, syntax, metalogic and even the structural analysis are 
not altogether enough to operate a logical system. There is always a need for an heuristics, 
for a search strategy. This is put forward by the following equation (Aliseda 2006, p. 49):  
 Abductive Logic = Inference + Search Strategy 
 Several authors in this issue have stressed the need of devising heuristics within an 
abductive calculi, and thus put forward the view of logic as a search control strategy. In 
particular, in their contribution “Abduction through Semantic Tableaux versus Abduction 
through Goal-Directed Proofs”, Joke Meheus and Dagmar Provijn propose a calculi of 
such kind. According to these authors “abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of 
goal-directed proofs” (Meheus and Provijn, page 296, this issue), in the sense that the ex-
planandum is the starting point of the derivation and acts as guide to the inferences drawn 
during the derivation. Moreover, these kind of proofs form a decision method for A1, …, 
An  B, and are primarily based on the analysis of formulae (cf. Meheus and Provijn con-
tribution for the details).  
What is clear to me is that the diversity of ways to compute abduction continues to 
multiply. In the case of my own proposal, I do not regard it as a final word, for some other 
approaches have shown that it works better when combined with other procedures, such 
as the one by Meheus and Provijn.6
Abduction as Inference to the Best Explanation 
It is evident from my proposal that I do not deal with abduction as inference to the best 
explanation (IBE), for I do not tackle the problem of how to produce the best or minimal 
                                                     
6 I have an open discussion with Meheus and Provijn (cf. footnote 4 of their contribution) regarding my algorithms. 
I use this brief space to make a couple of remarks. The authors claim their method tackles in a more efficient 
and transparent way the production of good explanations, at least in so far as it gets rid of redundant, irrelevant 
and inconsistent ones. This seems to be the case. However, except for the inconsistencies, the production of ir-
relevant explanations is nevertheless produced in their calculi, though their method warrantees to mark the 
lines in which they appear and are thus not taken into account as responses (p. 302). However, I do not agree 
with their criticism on example 1, for my non-redundancy condition rules out those formulas which contain 
abductive explanations as subformulae (Aliseda 2006, p. 111). 
Another issue I would like to point out concerns my definition of partial explanations. My intuition is right in that 
partial explanations are those formula α which effect a semi-closed extension over a tableau for the theory θ and 
the negation of the observation (¬ϕ). However, in the case of conjunctive explanations, in order to avoid the 
production of inconsistent explanations, it is needed that the proposed conjunctive explanation effects a semi-
closed extension over the original tableau for the theory θ as well. Therefore, a finer definition for a partial ex-
planation α is one in which both Τ (Θ + (¬ϕ) + α) and Τ (Θ + α ) are semi-closed. Given this refinement, an 
additional instruction may be added after instruction 6 of my algorithm (Aliseda 2006, p. 115), just as Meheus 
and Provijn have observed in their criticism, which I gratefully acknowledge.  
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abduction. Methodologically, I made a choice of splitting the problem of abduction into 
two processes: generation and selection.7 This separation helps to split the logical and the 
empirical aspects of an abductive explanation into two. According to Niiniluoto, my ap-
proach is discussed in the weaker sense, in which abduction is reasoning from a fact to 
one of it potential explanations, rather than the stronger sense, in which the reasoning is to 
the minimal or best explanation. This is of course in line with Hempel’s notion of potential 
explanation, one which complies with the logical criteria but needs a further test for truth to 
be assessed as an explanation.  
I defend to split the generation and the selection processes of abduction for its logical 
analysis, but grant at the same time that a picture of abduction is incomplete when one of 
them is missing. Moreover, sometimes it is not evident that the same kind of abduction 
(and in particular, of selection) is taking place in both common sense reasoning and scien-
tific reasoning. In his contribution “Abduction and Inference to the Best Explanation”, 
Valeriano Iranzo makes this point arguing that while abductions performed for perceptual 
judgment have in general no problem in assessing quite automatically its truth-value, ab-
duction set in the scientific context is much more sophisticated: “History of science is 
paved with discarded, and presumably, false theories” (Iranzo, page 342, this issue). A 
reliabilist justification for abduction works for the former, but not for the latter. We need a 
finer account of what counts as the best explanation, or as a good explanation, for that 
matter. There is no consensus on this matter, however, for there seems to be no best ex-
planation of what counts as such.8
Regarding my own position (according to Iranzo I favor a purely heuristic approach as 
opposed to an epistemic one), I do endorse a heuristic approach, at least in so far my logi-
cal and computational analysis can support. I argue in my book that the selection process 
is beyond logical criteria, and belongs rather to a pragmatic context. This does not mean 
however, that I do not take an epistemological stance in regard to abduction. Indeed, I 
consider abduction as an epistemic process for belief change (Aliseda 2006, cf. chapter 8), 
and this is the topic of next section. 
Abduction as Belief Revision 
In my view, abduction is an epistemic process for belief change. The overall cognitive 
process is depicted as follows:  
A novel or an anomalous experience (cf. chapter 2) gives place to a surprising phenomenon, generating 
a state of doubt which breaks up a belief habit and accordingly triggers abductive reasoning. The goal 
of this type of reasoning is precisely to explain the surprising fact and therefore soothe the state of 
doubt. It is ‘soothe’ rather than ‘destroy’ for an abductive hypothesis has to be put into test and be eco-
                                                     
7 Other authors draw on this distinction. Witness Magnani’s “creative vs. selective abduction”. Peirce himself refers 
to both in connection to abduction. 
8 As Iranzo points out, while Niiniluoto makes a link between explanatory value and truth by means of confirma-
tion, Psillos favors the best explanation as the one which fits better our background beliefs, by means of the 
notions of acceptance and coherence. Psillos account works well for everyday reasoning and the one by Ni-
iniluoto seems more appropriate for scientific contexts in which it comes down to selecting the explanation 
that best confirms the theory, with respect to the rest in stock. 
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nomic, attending to the further criteria that Peirce proposed. The abductive explanation is simply a 
suggestion that has to be put to test before converting itself into a belief.9 (Aliseda 2006, p. 175) 
 In this respect, my view seems compatible with that of Woods: “not only does abduc-
tion not secure us knowledge, it does not warrant belief” (Woods, page 315, this issue). 
Abduction only provides a reason to suspect, and this is were the conjectural aspect shows its 
face. This is a true claim when made over the explanatory aspect of abduction, of which 
Peirce’s logical formulation is based. The point is that the conjectural character of abduc-
tion may be surpassed when the testability requirement is at work. However, going back to 
the example of criminal jurisprudence, that is a case in which all evidence is already given, 
and there is no possibility for further testing hypotheses at hand.10
Thus, the road from ignorance to knowledge is a complex one, involving several steps, 
and in which it is often impossible to walk it all the way through. In fact, even in a scien-
tific context, the result of testing a hypothesis gives only an approximate truth as an out-
come. In his contribution “Idealization, Abduction, and Progressive Scientific Change”, 
Xavier de Donato links abduction to two key notions in scientific change, namely idealiza-
tion and concretization, and presents them as the very essence of the scientific method.11 For 
him, “to abduce the best explanation becomes in the present context to find the best con-
cretized form of a certain law, which is proved to be approximately true” (de Donato, 
page 336, this issue). In fact, although it is in principle impossible to test idealizations —
given that their ideal conditions are never realizable— the way of testing them is by an 
approximation to the limit value, proving that the idealized law approximately holds. An 
example of an intertheoretical relation of this kind is the Kepler-Newton case (Kepler’s 
laws of planetary notion vs. Newtonian celestial mechanics), in which “Newton accepted 
Kepler’s laws as empirical generalizations holding only approximately and arrived at his 
theory in part trying to give a theoretical explanation for these laws” (de Donato, page 336, 
this issue). 
The link to my abductive proposal is straightforward, for the logic of idealization is 
based on Gärdenfors belief revision model, in particular applied to the account of counter-
factual suppositions, those that effect the belief change over the theory. Moreover, this 
view is also directly linked to my abductive semantic tableaux model when applied to Kui-
pers’ notion of instrumentalist abduction, theory revision aiming at empirical progress (Aliseda 
2006, cf. chapter 6). One final thing to point out on the challenge made by de Donato, 
                                                     
9 For Peirce, three aspects determine whether a hypothesis is promising: it must be explanatory, testable, and economic. 
A hypothesis is an explanation if it accounts for the facts. Its status is that of a suggestion until it is verified, 
which explains the need for the testability criterion. Finally, the motivation for the economic criterion is two-
fold: a response to the practical problem of having innumerable explanatory hypotheses to test, as well as the 
need for a criterion to select the best explanation amongst the testable ones.  
10 Woods is right in highlighting the conjectural character of abduction, something that is often overseen and it is 
certainly a misrepresented aspect of abduction, and makes perfectly good sense in the cases where testing is 
impossible. Another area in which this is the case concerns historiography, in which the historical hypotheses 
cannot be tested against a past that is already behind.  
11 The idealization-concretization process goes from idealizations —which involves model construction and the 
assumption of certain counterfactual conditions in order to derive laws from theories— to the concretizations 
of theories considered to be approximately true.  
Abductive Reasoning: Challenges Ahead 269 
namely to apply my abductive tableaux model, is that we would have an opportunity to 
test real life scientific cases. I am particularly interested in those cases involving anomalies, 
and in this respect semantic tableaux are once more, a natural vehicle to represent theory 
revision for anomalous cases. 
Moreover, when a view of science as problem solving is endorsed —such as the one 
by Popper and Simon (Aliseda 2006, cf. chapter 1)— together with my view of abduction 
as an epistemic process for belief change, the dichotomy of contexts of discovery vs. justi-
fication is doomed to fail. This is precisely issue raised by Ana Rosa Pérez Ransanz in her 
contribution “¿Qué Queda de la Distinción entre Contexto de Descubrimiento y Contex-
to de Justificación?”:12  
Abduction [understood as a process of epistemic change] allows to integrate in a natural way, both 
processes of ideas generation and evaluation (using Aliseda’s terminology), something which makes 
even more evident the artificial character of the old discovery-justification dichotomy. (Pérez-Ransanz, 
page 350, this issue) 
Are Abductive Tableaux in Our Heads? 
The tableaux representation together with its machinery for computing abductions is sug-
gestive as a psychological model and raises a new challenge —which goes beyond the con-
ceptual analysis done in my book— namely whether these tree tableaux structures are 
plausible as a model of the mind for performing abduction. This issue is raised by Sílvio 
Pinto in his contribution “Dos Aspectos del Razonamiento Abductivo”.13 According to 
him:  
An answer to this question would have to appeal to the psychological evidence for or against the pro-
posal of abductive semantic tableaux and, in a larger frame, it would depend on the greater or smaller 
plausibility of the so called computational model of the mind. (Pinto, page 322, this issue) 
 However, for Pinto, there is still and alternative answer for the causal effectiveness of 
intentional mental processes, like the one determined by the semantic contents of the 
mental states involved in the cognitive human processes (cf. Pinto’s contribution for the 
full discussion). This is an answer of a non-computational kind and rather based on the 
concept of radical interpretation, a core notion in contemporary analytic philosophy, which 
basically states that the semantic content of a certain language L results from the interpre-
tation process of speakers of language L, given their behaviour (linguistic and otherwise) 
as evidence. For Pinto this “is an alternative explanation of the determination of causal 
regularities in the mental processes, given by the semantic content of their respective rep-
resentations” (Pinto, page 323, this issue). Another contribution equally concerned with 
real life plausibility of logical models for human beings performing abduction, is the one 
by Lorenzo Magnani “Logic and Abduction: Cognitive Externalizations in Demonstrative 
Environments.” Magnani responds to this challenge with a distributed cognition ap-
proach, concerning “the role of logical models as forms of cognitive externalizations pre-
existent in-formal human reasoning performances” (Magnani, page 275, this issue). For 
                                                     
12 “What Remains of the Context of Discovery vs. Context of Justification Distinction?” The quote to her contri-
bution is my translation.  
13 “Two Aspects of Abductive Reasoning”. The quotes to his contribution are my translations.  
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him, human beings spontaneously perform hasty generalization and abductive diagnoses, 
and this type of low-level in-formal inferential performances are part of the kit for human 
survival (cf. Magnani’s contribution for further details). Woods and Gabbay also highlight 
the role of logic for basic human behavior: “It is that the reasoning actually performed by 
individual agents is sufficiently reliable not to kill them” (quoted in Magnani, page 282, this 
issue). So, we are after all, logical animals, as Peirce himself stated in his famous “The Fixa-
tion of Belief.” Johan’s van Benthem provoking assertion seems also appropriate: “Logic is 
the Immune System of the Mind” (van Benthem, page 273, this issue). A natural step in 
this direction would be to promote research on psychological abduction, and team up with 
cognitive psychologists to learn from their empirical research. There are already several 
competing theories of the mind with regard to human abductive performance. As shown, 
the traditions of Logic, Analytic Philosophy and Cognitive Science, have each one offered 
an alternative answer. 
Conclusion 
I give no conclusion for this pot of challenges ahead for abduction, offered by the thought 
provoking, critical and challenging contributions. They opened an agenda of new research 
on abduction, showing the discussion still continues. I would like to express my gratitude 
to all contributors to this issue and to Johan van Benthem for agreeing to write the presen-
tation to this forum. I am also grateful to Andoni Ibarra, main editor of this Journal, for 
his invitation and encouragement to prepare this issue. I hope the reader will find some-
thing interesting and useful in the papers to follow.  
 Let me close by paraphrasing John Woods on the status of research of abduction: 
Abductive logic is still a work in progress. There is, as of yet, no wholly dominant view of it. The time 
may come when a consensus builds around a given model. When that happens, it is quite possible that 
it will be yet another approach. But it is entirely clear that such consensus can only arise out of the con-
tinuing efforts of the leading stakeholders to deepen, extend and generalize upon their own efforts to 
date. (Personal communication, 2005) 
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